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Abstract—Cyber criminals increasingly target Small and
Medium Sized Businesses (SMEs) since they are perceived to
have the weakest defences. Some will not survive a cyber attack,
and others will have their ability to continue trading seriously
impaired. There is compelling evidence that, at present, SMEs do
not seem to be implementing all the advisable security measures
which could help them to resist such attacks.
Many in the security industry believe that this is because SMEs
do not take the threat seriously. This paper reports on a study
to find out whether this is the case, or not.
The primary finding is that most SMEs do care about the
threat but that very few implement even a small subset of the
available security precautions. One contributory factor seemed
to be the uncertainty caused by the wealth of conflicting and
confusing online advice offered by industry and official bodies.
This seemed to be hindering rather than helping SMEs so that
they did not know what actions to take to improve their resilience.
The conclusion is a recommendation for actions to be taken to
better inform SMEs and help them to secure their systems more
effectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security industry is reporting a major increase in cyber
crime, and indications are that such crime is increasingly
targeting SMEs [1], which make up 99% of UK businesses
[2]. The criminals’ new focus is probably because SMEs are
an easier target than large companies [3]. Donnelly [4] predicts
that 41% of all ransomware attacks will be aimed at small
businesses in 2016.
The risks to SME assets include disclosure, corruption,
destruction of the data, denying access to data and data theft,
all with the potential to disrupt business activities. Some
attacks on SMEs have appeared in the media [5] but it seems
that many business owners are too worried about reputational
damage to publicise attacks, preferring instead to absorb the
loss [6]. With the low reporting rates it is difficult to gauge
the actual size of the problem. There are strong indications,
however, that in reality SMEs are at serious risk of becoming
cyber attack victims.
The average cost of recovering from an attack was £1000
in 2015, but the long term impact is much more serious.
Large companies increasingly cut off SME suppliers who have
experienced an attack [7]. This means that the reputational
damage that results from a cyber attack can have long-term
impacts on the business. The business could lose customers,
be removed from supply chains and lose government contracts,
thereby impairing long-term sustainability. 83% of customers
that KPMG surveyed were concerned about their data, and the
care businesses took with their data [7]. Small businesses who
neglect this duty of care might well go out of business, perhaps
without being fully aware of this eventuality.
This paper reports on a study which explored Scottish
SMEs’ risk perceptions with respect to cyber attack as well as
their current security practices. The research question explored
in this paper is:
Do SMEs take the Cyber Security threat seriously?
II. SME RISK PERCEPTION AND SECURITY
MANAGEMENT STANCE
There is plenty of evidence that points to a significant
number of Scottish SMEs not implementing sufficient security
measures, and underestimating the risk of cyber attack. KPMG
carried out a survey late in 2015 and found that 1 in 5
businesses took no security measures at all to resist attack
[7]. Aviva’s 2015 survey [8] also found that two out of five
small businesses did not believe they would fall victim to a
cyber attacker while Zurich’s survey of 3000 SMEs found that
11% of UK businesses did not believe themselves to be a
target [9]. Even those who are aware of their vulnerability
often do not seem to implement sufficient measures to protect
their businesses [7].
In order to find explanations for why SMEs could adopt a
particular risk perception stance, and to explore different risk
management approaches, a systematic search of the research
literature pertaining to SME “decision making”, “risk denial”,
“risk communication” and “threat appeal” was carried out.
Google Scholar, ScienceDirect, SpringerLink and DBLP were
consulted to find relevant papers for “information security” to-
gether with risk communication/risk denial/SME. The themes
that emerged from the research papers informed the rest of this
discussion.
A. Risk Perception
Threat appeals are “persuasive messages designed to scare
people by describing the terrible things that will happen to
them if they do not do what the message recommends” [10]
(p. 329). People’s perceptions of the risk will be impacted by
the way they process any threat appeals that they encounter.
People do not necessarily react in an objective way to the threat
appeal: individuals will react differently depending on their life
experiences, their attitudes, personality and many other aspects
[11].
Unaware
The first possibility is that people are unaware of the threat.
This seems unlikely, since hardly a week goes by without some
cyber breach being reported in the news. In 2015, 480 million
records were breached [12] including some that remained
in the news for some time [13]. Pritchard [14] reports that
awareness levels have risen over the last few years so complete
unawareness, in 2016, is unlikely.
Minor or Medium Risk
There are broadly two reasons why SME owners might
underestimate the risk. The first is that they do not fully
comprehend the extent of the risk. The second is that they
decline to acknowledge it — various psychological factors
come into play that make it hard for them to see the risk
for what it is. The former can happen if the message about the
risk has been misunderstood completely, or become garbled so
that they do not understand it.
On the other hand, the source of the risk communication
may be mistrusted, especially if the source is an industry or
government body [15] who appears to be promoting their own
interests [16]. Frewer explains that mistrust of “experts” grew
from the late 20th century onwards [17]. If the source is not
trusted it is likely that the message will be rejected altogether.
Slovic et al. [18] explain that people assess risk primarily
experientially, not purely using reason. They say “We cannot
assume that an intelligent person can understand the meaning
of and properly act upon even the simplest of numbers such
as amounts of money or numbers of lives at risk, not to
mention more esoteric measures or statistics pertaining to risk,
unless these numbers are infused with affect” (p321). Hence,
presenting people with figures and facts will often fail to gain
their attention or interest. Their reaction will depend on how
the information is presented [19] and because people do not
understand probability very well they might easily misinterpret
any figures that are presented to them.
Risk denial is a second possibility. Business owners may
consider their companies too small to be significant, or they
might not consider their data to be of any value [20]. Some-
times people may feel that there is no point implementing
measures when the cyber criminals’ skills are so superior to
their own. They might not believe that their responses will
have any efficacy [21]. Fromm [22] reported that some people
acknowledge a risk but do not believe that the risk applies to
them personally. This tendency was confirmed by [23]. Fromm
referred to this as an optimism bias, which leads to a sense
of invincibility [24]. Such invincibility often manifests when
the link between risky behaviour and outcome is uncertain or
delayed, as it is for people not implementing security measures.
Getting people to take a risk seriously, especially when there
is no immediate or testable feedback available to confirm the
risk, is difficult [25]. A sense of invincibility could also come
into being when people have not experienced an attack. The
fact that others are attacked can actually exacerbate a sense of
invulnerability, instead of acting to re-align risk perceptions
as intuition would suggest [26]. Another explanation could
be that acknowledging the threat would require a great deal
of effort to be made to mitigate it, and this is somehow too
uncomfortable. So, they become wilfully blind [27], simply
refusing to acknowledge the existence of the problem. Kessels
et al. [28] found that a threat communication could lead to
an avoidance response, especially when the communication
particularly emphasised the size of the threat, and the recipient
considered the threat to be self evident. Ruiter et al. explain
that people seem motivated to protect their self-image by
denying threatening messages [29].
Finally, people have a desperate need to confirm their
existing assessment of a particular hazard [19]. Slovic explains
the tremendous difficulty of shifting existing preconceptions
by giving people hard facts. If emotions are not acknowledged
or addressed people might even use the facts to confirm their
existing stance. Martha Nussbaum [30] says: “Emotions are
not just the fuel that powers the psychological mechanism of a
reasoning creature. They are parts, highly complex and messy
parts, of this creature’s reasoning itself.” (p. 3).
It is clear that one cannot address the problem of people
underestimating the risk by providing them with the facts. We
need to find ways to “add tears” to the cyber risk message
[18] — what we cannot continue to do is to appeal purely
to people’s reason as if emotions either do not exist or are
an inconvenient add-on. This has been effective in other
disciplines, for example health [31].
Significant Risk
A personal experience of a cyber attack or a data breach is
likely to have the desired effect of bringing perceptions into
line with the reality of the risk. Fromm [22] confirmed this,
finding that personal experience was extremely influential in
realigning perceptions and encouraging behaviour change. This
is the worst way for people to realise the reality of a risk since
it is likely to involve a financial or reputational cost, let alone
the harm caused by the privacy invasion that is likely to result
from a breach.
This state, then, is probably inhabited by those who have
either experienced an attack, forcing them to evaluate the risk
realistically, or those who were able to process and accept
the risk message when they heard it. There are a number
of individual factors that influence whether people take risk
messages seriously or not, including personality, for example
[32], so this is difficult to accommodate in design.
B. Risk Management
People can be lax about security, basically ignoring it and
doing nothing to address the threats. They could also be
concerned, taking some measures, but being satisfied with a
minimum of measures instead of transiting to the concerned
stance, where they do as much as possible to protect them-
selves.
Lax About Security
Some SMEs might be able to rationalise the risk away
altogether, and choose to take no measures at all. For solo
businesses making minimal use of Information Technology
(IT) this might well be a reasonable strategy, but for larger
businesses and those heavily reliant on IT this is an unwise
option.
One explanation was put forward by Njenga and Jordaan
[33] who discovered, in their study, that some SMEs did
not want to follow advice, preferring to follow their own
inclinations.
Care About Security
Businesses need to implement a suite of security measures.
They tend to know about strong passwords and about anti-virus
software [34]. The problem is that the cyber threat landscape
changes all the time, and relying solely on these tools will
not prevent cyber attacks. So, while the use of an incomplete
set of measures will help to a certain extent, it does leave
businesses more vulnerable than they realise [35]. SMEs could
well be labouring under a misapprehension that they are indeed
secure. This will mean they do not look for more information
or advice, and live under a false sense of security.
An SME that acknowledges the likelihood of attack is still
at risk of implementing insufficient measures. The literature
suggests a number of factors could lead to this state.
(1) Lacks Skills
An SME being presented with a fear appeal will assess it
based on (a) the perceived magnitude of the event; (b) the
perceived probability of the event happening; and (c) whether
a response will be efficacious [36]. Maddux and Rogers [37]
argue that efficacy is the most important of these, in terms
of persuasion. A fear appeal, in other words, will fail if the
recipient does not have the necessary expertise to respond, and
does not know what advice to follow to deal with the fear. The
SME might not have the required expertise or have employees
with the requisite skills [21], and might have to rationalise the
fear away as a way of dealing with it.
(2) Lacks Resources
A full quarter (24%) of a recent survey’s respondents
considered cyber security to be too expensive [38], which
seems to lend support to this possibility.
It could also be that SMEs feel that the required security
measures are too arduous and not warranted by their per-
ceptions of their vulnerability. They may also genuinely lack
resources to implement all the measures [39]. The real issue,
as West [40] points out, is that the costs are immediate but the
benefits nebulous and hard to quantify. West also argues that
people will prefer to gamble for a loss than accept a sure loss.
An expense is a certain loss and in the face of an uncertain loss
that might result from not being protected, they are likely not
to implement measures and, of course, other business priorities
can crowd out security considerations [41].
(3) Lacks Perseverance
A business could implement a number of security measures
and then, over time, become lax, especially since there is no
visible benefit that accrues from the extra effort and expense
[42], or simply because they inhabit a sense of false security
because they have not kept up with the emerging risks.
Concerned About Security
This implies an understanding of the measures to take,
and the wherewithal to implement them. No one is ever
100% secure, but these measures will significantly reduce
the likelihood of falling victim to an attack, or breaching
confidential data.
A one-off implementation is never the end point. Businesses
have to re-evaluate regularly, keep informed and be prepared to
make security a journey and not expect a one-off inoculation.
Otherwise they might well transition to being serious about
security.
C. Interaction Between Risk Perception and Risk Management
The previous two sections considered each of these sepa-
rately but this does not mean that they are independent. Witte
[43] says that if people receive a message about a potential
threat they will seek to maintain control, in one of two ways:
• If they know how to protect themselves, they will take
action to do so. This is a danger control process;
• If they do not know how to protect themselves, they
will reject the message, and act to control the fear in
that way.
Thus people could initially accept the message, but if they
are unable to take the correct protective action they will
reconsider the message and reject it, or rationalise it away, in
order to re-establish control over the situation. If the advice is
unclear or inaccessible people are likely to reject the message
altogether, simply because of a deep human need to maintain
control [44].
Witte’s findings have been confirmed by [11]: all agree that
the person’s perceptions of their own efficacy in dealing with a
threat have a significant impact on their behavioural response
to a threat. Latour and Rotfeld [45] also found that efficacy in
dealing with the threat had an impact on the person’s attitude
towards the message. Watson et al. [46] (p. 213) argue that
“The most consistent and definitive conclusions appear to
be in relation to the importance, not of fear arousal but, of
relevance (i.e, vulnerability) and provision of coping strategies
and recommendations that an individual can effectively enact
to avoid or prevent a threat from occurring (i.e., efficacy).”
Another aspect is the person’s pre-existing behaviour with
respect to the threat. Cho and Salmon [47] found that people
who were already in the habit of taking precautions were much
more open to taking further actions to mitigate a threat. Those
who had not previously contemplated taking precautionary
actions were much harder to convince. Hence advice that is
overly voluminous or comprehensive will probably be rejected
by those who unused to taking any precautions at all: the very
people who need most to be convinced of the need to take
action.
The clear conclusion to be drawn from these findings is
that unless people know how to reduce a threat, and have
confidence that their actions are reducing the threat, they will
deny the threat, and take no or very little action to ameliorate
it. It seems that the way advice is provided is almost more
important than the threat appeal itself.
III. CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO HELP SMES
The USA government, whose SMEs are also at risk, propose
a number of mitigations [48]. Here we list their suggestions,
along with the existing mitigations in Scotland and the UK.
• Provide more guidance — the Scottish Business Re-
silience Centre (SBRC)[49] publishes advice and infor-
mative videos online. The Federation for Small Busi-
nesses [50] also make a number of resources available
online, as do the Scottish Government and Information
Commissioner.
• Find ways of fostering economies of scale for SMEs
— the Scottish Business Resilience Centre provides
a sponsored service to SMEs to help them to test
their security provision. Innovate UK provided grants
in 2015 to help SMEs to improve their security 1, and
Scottish Enterprise is shortly launching a scheme to fund
accreditation efforts2.
• Provide additional resources — The UK government
is promoting the Cyber Essentials accreditation [51],
trying to get businesses in the UK to take the first steps
towards greater cyber resilience. A website called Cyber
Streetwise [52] provides advice to people on a personal
and business level.
• Devote additional resources to fighting cyber crime
— The Scottish Government take cyber crime very
seriously, as evidenced by their development of a Cyber
Resilience Strategy for Scotland3, informed by a widely-
publicised consultation process4.
A. Security Measure Classification
Security measures can be classified as [53]:
• Deterrent — these reduce the possibility of attack. This
entails keeping up with the threat landscape and imple-
menting preventive measures as they become necessary.
• Preventive – these defend vulnerabilities. For example,
access controls, backups, patching and firewalls.
• Corrective – alleviates the consequences of an attack.
For example, reporting of an attack, investigation and
mitigation of risk.
• Detective — these actively seek evidence of an attack
and activate corrective or preventive controls.
B. What Kinds of Advice are SMEs Likely to Find?
It is worth considering what people find if they use Google,
since Google is the most used site in the UK5. (Gov.uk is
24th on the list). Renaud [54] demonstrates the profusion of
conflicting advice that results from such a search.
It is challenging to filter the good advice and to know what
to trust when confronted by such a wealth of information.
In reviewing available online advice, aggregated data was
derived from sites listed on the first page of a Google search for
“security measures small business” as well as advice offered
by official UK and Scottish bodies.
A number of studies have shown that when people have too
many options to choose from, they often decline to choose
at all, especially when there is no clear way to differentiate
the options from each other [55]. This situation might well
lead to an “intention-behaviour gap” [29], where people either
don’t know how to start, or get confused and then implement









of. This point is also made by Richard Hollis from the Risk
Factory, that SMEs find it very hard to figure out what their
priorities ought to be6. He also explains that the terminology
used by advice-givers can confuse rather than help. What
SMEs really need is a single set of clear steps they should take.
The advice providers must come together to agree on a unified
set of advice that will constitute an agreed “Best Practice”
for SMEs. While the experts disagree to such an extent it is
likely that the ensuing confusion is leading to uncertainty and
inaction.
IV. RESEARCH STUDY
A study was carried out to explore SME risk perceptions
and security management practices7. A number of one-to-one
interviews were carried out with small businesses to explore
their perceptions and practices. The researcher discovered
that businesses would not grant interviews unless they either
knew the researcher or had a recommendation from someone
they knew. This is understandable in a world where many
scammers try to trick people out of their hard-earned money.
The researcher only gained access to business owners via
recommendations from acquaintances or University contacts.
Paper-based surveys were then posted to randomly chosen
businesses across Scotland, to allow them to respond anony-
mously via postage paid envelopes. In order to ensure an even
coverage of Scotland’s businesses a database of businesses was
constructed by harvesting business details from various sources
across the Web, including the UK small business directory,
Chambers of Commerce and trade finder websites. Over 18 000
business details were accumulated, and validated in terms of
number of employees. Where it was possible to ascertain this,
businesses with more than 100 employees were removed from
the database. The researcher then used the SQL randomiser to
randomly choose 600 addresses as targets for mailed surveys.
When surveys were returned because the business was no
longer trading, the survey was mailed to another randomly
chosen business. The businesses were located in towns ranging
from Kelso in the east to Arran in the west, from Dumfries in
the South to Lerwick in the north.
V. FINDINGS
110 people participated in the study. 32% were solo busi-
nesses, 63% had 30 or fewer employees and 5% had up to 100
employees. 35% operated their businesses from home.
When asked to rate the importance of IT to their business
on a scale of 1(unimportant) to 5(very important), the average
rating across all participants was 4.3. When asked to rate how
concerned they were about the security of their company’s
information, on a scale of 1(unconcerned) to 5 (I lose sleep),
the average was 2.09.
In terms of who they asked for advice, 53% of the par-
ticipants consulted Google, and 7% consulted government
websites. 23% consulted their IT service provider.
6https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6JkuEM126Ds
7Ethical Approval was obtained from the University of Glasgow College
Ethics Committee
18% of participants did not make backups. Those who did
make backups were asked about the frequency. The most likely
answer was Daily (38% of respondents). 19% made backups
as and when necessary so did not seem to do it regularly or
reliably. When asked whether they thought they might become
the target of a hacking attack, the majority did not think this
would happen to them.
When asked who they would report it to if they were hacked,
15 mentioned reporting the police. Five of these said they
would not report it, and one said he would only report it for
insurance purposes.
When asked what the Scottish government could do, an-
swers fell into the following categories:
• Funding, including subsidised access to security services
and experts;
• Information and Advice tailored for SMEs, Workshops,
Breakfast Talks;
• Better Policing of hackers;
• Advice about security software, free software.
A. Risk Perceptions
The first step was to determine which of the states the
participants fell into. A broad stroke classification was carried
out as follows:
Minor Risk: When asked if they could be targeted by a
cyber attack they said it would never happen or that there
was only a remote chance. 52% of participants fell into this
category.
Medium Risk: These participants acknolwedged a likeli-
hood of an attack but considered that there was a small chance
of falling victim. 33% of participants.
Significant Risk: These participants considered themselves
likely or extremely likely to be a target of an attack. 15% of
the participants fell into this category.
B. Security Management Categories
To assess categories we used reports of implementation of a
very small subset of existing security measures. We chose the
most well-known preventive measures that did not require the
use of jargon: backups, access-control, anti-virus software and
patching of operating systems. Since all the indicators from
other survey were that SMEs were generally unsophisticated
in terms of security measures we considered that checking for
implementation of a small subset of measures would give an
indication of security stance.
Lax About Security: Participants were allocated to this
state if they said they were unsure about whether or not they
ought to be worried about their company’s information. Other
signals were being unsure about, or considering unimportant,
the preventive measures: backups, using access control mea-
sures, anti-virus and patching their operating systems. Only
5% of participants fell into this category.
Care About Security: These participants implemented
some measures but the coverage was often patchy. If they
considered any of the preventive measures: backups, access
control, anti-virus or patching, unimportant this was an in-
dicator. Finally, if they said they were unconcerned about
using WiFi this indicated a level of naı¨vety that seriously
concerned participants probably would not demonstrate (81%
participants).
Concerned About Security: We considered that these
participants would make backups, and consider access control,
anti-virus and patching to be important, or very important.
They would be concerned or very concerned about using public
WiFi. 14% of participants met these requirements. Ideally they
would also have Cyber Essentials accreditation but if that
requirement is added none of the participants can be classified
as concerned.
Figure 1 shows how many participants inhabited each of the
risk perception and security management states.
Fig. 1. Number of participants in each State
C. Other Findings
A number of themes emerged from the analysis that the
literature review did not uncover.
The Role of IT Service Companies: 22 of the companies
relied primarily on IT service providers to take care of the
information security needs. When asked what action they
would take if they realised they had been hacked 37 specifically
referred to either their own IT service provider, or the fact that
they would call in someone knowledgeable. Only 5 said they
would ask a friend or family member to help them. This means
that these companies are in a position to play a key role in
improving resilience.
No Faith in Police: There was very little faith in the police
to remediate. Some said they would report it to cover their
backs, but that they did not expect the police to be able to help.
One business who had experienced a ransomware attack said
that the police had been of very little assistance to him. One
said “the police are overstretched and stressed. What would
they be able to do?” Another said: “they would not know what
to do”.
Low Levels of Expertise: The participants demonstrated a
knowledge of well-known measures such as strong passwords,
anti-virus and firewalls. The majority had no concept of the
risks of using public WiFi or of installing Apps on their
Smartphones. One said: “I am learning as I go along”, which
demonstrates an admirable openness, but probably means they
are currently insufficiently protected.
VI. DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
The question explored by this study was whether SMEs were
taking the cyber threat seriously. Certainly we confirmed that a
significant percentage were not doing so. Only 15% of the par-
ticipants had anything close to an accurate perception of their
vulnerability to attack. Moreover, this study checked whether
participants were implementing a small subset of the available
security measures, whether they were concerned about their
information and whether they understood the dangers of public
WiFi. Only 14% of participants covered all of these. The rest
implemented only some of the measures or were not very
concerned.
One possible contributor both to poor risk perception and
poor risk management is that the message about the magnitude
of the cyber threat risk was not being communicated effectively
to SMEs. If they do not understand, or are able to rationalise
the fear away, they will not accept the seriousness of the risk.
We also noticed that even those who had a realistic idea of
the risk did not reliably implement all the required measures.
A contributing factor here could be the fact that the available
advice is often overly technical, complex and overwhelming.
In terms of reaching SMEs, some viable (inexpensive)
options emerged from the analysis.
One source of advice: Provide a security advice website,
with one set of SME-targeted advice agreed upon by all
stakeholders. Ensure that it appears on page 1 of Google.
Structure the advice to answer the main questions to keep
things very simple (details can be linked to for those who are
interested):
What extra measures could I take to be even more secure?
What are the advantages of outsourcing to an IT service
provider? Where can I get funding? What do I do if I have
been hacked?
1) Why bother? (Risk Message “with tears”)
a) What is the risk of being hacked as an SME?
2) What should I do and how? (Security Management)
a) What basic security measures must I take?
b) What extra security measures would make me
even more secure?
c) What are the advantages of outsourcing to an IT
service provider?
d) Where can I get funding to help me with secu-
rity?
3) What do I do if I have been hacked? What actions
should I take? (Incident Response)
Engage Locally with SMEs: Arrange SME-specific events,
dealing with something they care about, like business continu-
ity, specifically not advertised as security events. When people
attend these, tell them about cyber security. Find a way to inject
emotion, but be careful of overhyping and always ensure that
they know where to get advice. Provide inexpensive reminders
of the advice website on something they use in their everyday
lives (keyring, stickers). Provide a newsletter they can sign up
to that provides up to date advice at regular intervals, so that
they are apprised of new risks, and measures they ought to
take to mitigate them.
Empower IT Service Providers: Local IT companies have
an important role to play. We should focus on improving their
security knowledge and directly supporting them.
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
The study reported in this paper was carried out to find
out whether Scottish SMEs were taking the risk of cyber
attack seriously, and were implementing sufficient measures
to protect their systems and information. We discovered that
many took at least some security measures but very few were
implementing all of the security measures in the small subset
we asked them about.
The reasons for this are two-fold. The first is that the risk
communication messages are primarily fact based and human
nature prefers to reason emotionally and experientially. The
second problem is that there is far too much advice available.
SMEs are becoming overwhelmed by the multitude of avail-
able advice, the exhaustive nature of the recommendations and
disagreements between security experts. It is vital for official
bodies to get together to issue one set of advice and for such
advice to be simple and easy to comprehend.
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